David Albright

The international inspectors should use authorities under the nuclear deal to go and look at this site, and see what's going on and start to verify a critical part of the nuclear deal.

It is necessary to identify where North Korea enriches uranium and part of that is understanding where it has done it in the past.

If they left it in some crowded place, that would be more of the risk. If they kept it together but without shielding, certainly it's not insignificant. You could cause some panic with this. They would want to get this back.

(Details) should be released because it's undermining the IAEA's credibility, whatever the outcome of the sampling, the secrecy makes it harder to determine whether it's a credible sampling approach.

I think how this is settled could very well determine if this deal is ever implemented, this deal can only work if it can be verified, and it can only be verified if the inspectors have access to the suspect nuclear sites.

It keeps the infrastructure in place and keeps a leg up, if Senator Graham and Senator Menendez want to restart [ uranium ] enrichment operations.

Six years is a bit over the top for a missile-delivered nuclear warhead, and this claim contradicts U.S. intelligence assessments.

$The time to prepare a test device is a fraction of the time to bu... by David Albright$

The time to prepare a test device is a fraction of the time to build a missile deliverable one.